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Constitutional Possibilities†
LAWRENCE B. SOLUM!
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF ILLUSORY CONSTITUTIONAL POSSIBILITIES 
What are our constitutional possibilities? The importance of this question is 
illustrated by the striking breadth of constitutional possibilities discussed recently in 
high constitutional theory. Contemporary constitutional theory ranges from Sotirios 
Barber’s reading of the United States Constitution as a guarantee of fundamental 
economic equality1 to Randy Barnett’s call to restore a lost constitution that guarantees 
individual liberty.2 The range of constitutional options includes James Fleming’s 
perfectionist reading of the Constitution as a charter for deliberative autonomy3 and 
Sanford Levinson’s proselytization for a revolutionary program of constitutional 
redesign that would abolish the Electoral College and equal representation of the states 
in the Senate.4 Are these constitutional possibilities real or illusory? And how can we 
answer that question? 
Theorists like Barber, Barnett, Fleming, and Levinson are conventionally 
understood as placing constitutional options on the table and as proponents of their 
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adoption—in other words, as advocates of constitutional change. Normative 
constitutional theory asks the question whether these options are desirable—whether 
political actors (citizens, legislators, executives, or judges) should take action to bring 
about their plans for constitutional reform or revolution. Frequently, normative 
constitutional theories are criticized on the ground that they are undesirable, unwise, or 
inconsistent with the best theories of political morality and legitimate legal authority, 
but sometimes one hears a very different form of criticism, expressed in locutions such 
as the following: “That is unrealistic.” “That’s not possible.” “That is pie in the sky.” 
“You are imagining castles in the air.” “Your suggestion is utopian.” “That isn’t 
feasible.” These objections invoke the idea of illusory constitutional possibility—
constitutional options that are not actual possibilities. 
This Essay addresses issues of constitutional possibility and necessity: What are our 
constitutional possibilities? How should we think about the feasible choice set for 
constitutional change? What are the differences between ideal and nonideal theory? 
What role should the ideas of path dependency and of second best play in 
constitutional theory? These inquiries cross the lines between normative, positive, and 
conceptual constitutional theory. At the conceptual level, we can analyze the content 
and meaning of phrases like “constitutional possibility,” “ideal theory,” and “the 
feasible choice set.”5 At the level of positive constitutional theory, we can ask about 
the forces and institutions that condition constitutional possibility. At the level of 
normative constitutional theory, we can ask about the implications of constitutional 
possibility for political morality.6
Our investigation of constitutional possibility will proceed as follows. Part I will 
cobble together a conceptual toolkit for thinking about possibility and necessity in 
constitutional theory: the tools will range from the familiar distinction between ideal 
and nonideal theory to a quick and dirty guide to the metaphysics of modality. Part II 
discusses three errors: the reduction of possibility to cost, the inference of practical 
possibility from conceivability, and the confusion of possibility and probability. Part 
III will explore the implications of the resulting proto-theory of constitutional 
possibility in two stages: stage one will investigate the normative implications, 
whereas stage two will reconnoiter a set of standards for making modal claims in 
constitutional arguments. Part IV provides two case studies in constitutional 
possibility: Sanford Levinson’s proposal for a Convention to enact structural reform of 
the United States Constitution, and Justice Antonin Scalia’s argument for originalism 
 
 
 5. I do not intend to take a stand on the methodology or utility of conceptual analysis—
beyond the minimalist point that such analysis can, at the very least, clarify the obscure, 
disambiguate the ambiguous, and specify the vague. 
 6. Before we proceed further, we should note meanings of the phrases “constitutional 
possibility” and “constitutional necessity” that are related to, but distinct from, the sense in 
which the phrase is used in this paper. We could use the phrase “constitutional possibility” to 
refer to those legal actions (in the broad sense that includes executive actions and orders, rules 
and legislation, and judicial decisions) that are possibly in compliance with or authorized by the 
constitution of some jurisdiction—that is, possibly constitutional under the United States 
Constitution. Similarly, the phrase “constitutional necessity” could be used to refer to those 
legal actions that are required by a constitution. And finally, constitutional necessity might be 
used in connection with the “necessary and proper clause” of the United States Constitution. For 
the most part, these senses of constitutional possibility and necessity will be set aside for the 
remainder of this essay. 
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as a method of constitutional interpretation. The Essay concludes with the problem of 
false constitutional necessity. 
 
I. A CONCEPTUAL TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL POSSIBILITY 
How can we think about constitutional possibility? This Part suggests a toolkit with 
eight elements: (1) an explication of the distinction between ideal and nonideal 
constitutional theory; (2) the idea of a constitutional second best; (3) path dependency; 
(4) the notion of the feasible choice set; (5) agent relativity; (6) the scope of decision 
problem; (7) a quick and dirty guide to the metaphysics of modality; and (8) a very 
short introduction to positive constitutional theory. 
 
A. The Distinction Between Ideal and Nonideal Constitutional Theory 
One way to think about constitutional possibilities begins with the distinction 
between ideal constitutions and constitutions that are made for a world that is less than 
ideal. This distinction can be approached by borrowing the distinction between “ideal” 
and “nonideal” theory from John Rawls.7 By “ideal theory,” Rawls means to refer to a 
moral or political theory that satisfies a condition of “full compliance” or “strict 
compliance.” Nonideal theory studies conditions of “partial compliance,” and hence 
addresses topics such as theories of punishment, civil disobedience, and justified 
revolution.8 Thus, we can ask: 
What principles ought a society to adopt for the purposes of designing its 
institutional structure on the condition that all of the institutions in society 
conform to these principles?9
The parallel question of normative constitutional theory might be phrased as follows: 
What constitution ought a society to adopt for the purposes of designing its basic 
legal structure on the condition that all of the institutions in society conform to the 
constitution? 
In other words, we can ask what constitution we ought to adopt, assuming that perfect 
compliance—each branch of government always respecting the limits on its power and 
the rights (if any) that the constitution confers on individuals. 
By way of contrast, we can ask questions of nonideal constitutional theory: 
What constitution ought a society to adopt for the purposes of designing its basic 
legal structure on the condition that the institutions of society will violate the 
constitution to the extent, and under the circumstances, that are predicted on the 
best understandings of human psychology and political science? 
 
 
 7. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 7–8, 215–16, 308–09 (rev. ed. 1999); Michael 
Phillips, Reflections on the Transition from Ideal to Non-Ideal Theory, 19 NOÛS 551 (1985). 
 8. See RAWLS, supra note 7, at 8. 
 9. Phillips, supra note 7, at 553. 
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That is, we might assume that constitutional actors will sometimes fail to comply with 
their constitutional duties by exceeding their allocated powers or violating the 
constitutional rights of individuals. Of course, the conditions for departure from perfect 
compliance can themselves be varied by making different assumptions about human 
psychology and institutional behavior or in some other way. Nonideal constitutional 
theory deals with the unconstitutional; the institution of judicial review might be seen 
as a paradigmatic topic for nonideal constitutional theory.10
It seems obvious that ideal and nonideal constitutional theories may differ. For 
example, because ideal constitutional theory assumes perfect compliance, the ideal 
constitution might dispense with the institution of judicial review, whereas nonideal 
theory might posit the necessity of such review in order to correct constitutional 
violations. Similarly, nonideal constitutional theory might adopt a constitutional rule 
that would not be ideal, but that would produce the best consequences given imperfect 
compliance. For example, the executive might be given a sphere of power more 
constrained than would be ideal because of an assumption that the executive will 
overreach and enlarge the sphere of executive power beyond constitutional limits. 
How does the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory relate to possibility? 
One might think that ideal theory deals with that which is not possible, whereas 
nonideal theory deals with the realm of that which is possible, but which would be a 
mistake. Perfect compliance may be impossible, but there is no a priori reason to 
believe that this is always so. Some constitutional provisions regularly result in perfect 
compliance. No President has been younger than 35 years of age; no state has had 
three Senators seated simultaneously; no state has opted for a monarchical form of 
government. Indeed, in cases like these, less than perfect compliance may be very 
unlikely or even “impossible” in some sense. Nonetheless, for a wide range of cases, 
perfect compliance may not be feasible and nonideal constitutional theory may be the 
norm. 
The better understanding of the relationship between ideal and nonideal theory is 
that ideal theory allows us to bracket certain kinds of impossibility—we can explore 
the implications of making unrealistic assumptions about compliance with 
constitutional norms. Nonideal theory allows us to explore the implications of realistic 
assumptions about human nature and social organization that (under some 
circumstances) make unconstitutionality a central problem for constitutional theory. 
The ideal and the impossible are not equivalent, but they are related in an important (if 
contingent) way. 
For this reason, the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory is an important 
tool for normative constitutional theory. The enterprise of ideal theory circumvents 
certain recurring types of impossibility objections—it allows us to engage in normative 
investigation while we set some issues of feasibility to the side. The enterprise of 
nonideal theory puts those feasibility issues back on the table. At an even more abstract 
level, Rawls’s distinction between ideal and nonideal theory points to the more general 
conceptual tool—the idealizing assumption, an essential component in a variety of 
 
 
 10. Of course, other institutions (such as congressional committees or executive offices) 
may deal with unconstitutionality outside the courts. See generally James E. Fleming, The 
Constitution Outside the Courts, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 215 (2000); Laurence Gene Sager, Fair 
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 
(1978). 
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formal models (for example, economic and positive political theory models).11 The 
movement between ideal and nonideal theory suggests the more general phenomena of 
making and then relaxing idealizing assumptions—including idealizing assumptions 
about possibility and feasibility. Idealizing assumptions allow the normative issues to 
be framed clearly and simply; relaxing those assumptions enables the move from 
constitutional theory to constitutional practice. 
 
B. The Idea of a Constitutional Second Best 
A second tool for reflection upon constitutional possibilities is the idea of a 
constitutional second best.12 To employ this tool, we can borrow economic theory’s 
distinction between “first-best” and “second-best” states of affairs.13 The general idea 
of the theory of the second best can be expressed as follows. Assume a system with 
multiple variables. Take the most desirable state the whole system could assume and 
the associated values that all of the variables must assume to produce this state: call 
this condition the first-best state of the system and call the associated values of the 
variables the first-best values. Now assume that at least one variable cannot assume the 
value necessary for the first-best state of the whole system: call this (or these) the 
constrained variable(s). Identify the most desirable state the whole system could 
assume given the constrained variable and the associated values that all the 
unconstrained variables must assume to produce this state: call this the second-best 
state of the system. There are systems in which achieving the second-best state will 
require that at least one variable other than the constrained variable assume a value 
other than the first-best value: call this value the second-best value. One expects that 
there are examples where many or even all variables must assume second-best values. 
 
 
 11. See generally Daniel M. Hausman, Philosophy of Economics, in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Sept. 12, 2003, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/economics/ 
(“Economics raises questions concerning the legitimacy of severe abstraction and idealization. 
For example, mainstream economic models often stipulate that everyone is perfectly rational 
and has perfect information or that commodities are infinitely divisible. Such claims are 
exaggerations, and they are clearly false. Other schools of economics may not employ 
idealizations that are this extreme, but there is no way to do economics if one is not willing to 
simplify drastically and abstract from many complications.”). 
 12. What is the relationship between the economic distinction between first best and second 
best and the philosophical distinction between ideal and nonideal theory? Clearly the two 
notions are related, and one might be tempted to equate “first best” with “ideal” and “second 
best” with “nonideal.” If these phrases are used loosely (and acknowledged as such), there is no 
problem with this equation. We could simply stipulate that “ideal” means “first best.” But in 
their technical senses, the two notions overlap but are not identical. Perfect compliance might be 
worse than imperfect compliance, so the “ideal” theory might be about the “second-best” state 
of the system. Compliance may not be the only relevant variable that could be constrained, so 
there could be “second-best” states of the system that cannot be differentiated from “first-best” 
states on the basis of the ideal/nonideal distinction. However, when compliance is the 
constrained variable and perfect compliance produces the best state of the system, there is a 
relevant mapping between ideal and nonideal theory and first-best and second-best states of the 
system. 
 13. See generally R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 
REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956) (articulating the theory of second best in economics). 
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Notice that the formal economic idea of the second best is always relative to which 
variables are constrained. To take a very simple illustration: if a system has three 
variables (a, b, and c), there could be three “second-best” states of the system—one 
relative to the assumption that variable a is constrained, another relative to assumed 
constraint of b, and a third relative to assumed constraint of c. More generally, what 
counts as second best depends on assumptions about the set of possible or feasible 
choices. Outside of formal theory, there may be a fact of the matter about which 
variables are constrained, and hence there may be a unique constitutional second best. 
The idea of a constitutional second best is found in Cass Sunstein and Adrian 
Vermeule’s work on constitutional interpretation and institutional capacity.14 In the 
course of making their argument for simple-minded formalism as the second-best 
theory of constitutional interpretation, Sunstein and Vermeule argue that the 
institutional capacities of judges are a constraining variable.15 In particular, judicial 
capacity may not be able to assume the value required by the first-best theory of 
constitutional interpretation.16 Therefore, another variable, that is the normative theory 
of interpretive methodology must assume a second-best value in order to produce the 
second-best state of the system of constitutional interpretation. In other words, if the 
judiciary lacks the institutional capacity to do what first-best theories require, then an 
institutional theory is required in order to produce second-best outcomes. For this 
reason, “institutional analysis is necessary, even if not sufficient, to an adequate 
evaluation of interpretive methods.”17
The notion of a “constitutional second best” should be differentiated from the role 
that the second best plays in formal economic theory. In that realm, the notion of a 
constrained variable is treated as an assumption: given that variable v cannot be 
assigned its first-best system value p then the second-best state of the whole system 
requires that variable u assume value r and not its first-best system value q. The notion 
of a constrained variable operates in a formal model—which may or may not be 
accurate or useful as a description of the world. Normative constitutional theory is 
rarely “formal”: concepts like “legitimacy,” “rights of political morality,” and 
“coherence of the legal materials” create difficult, if not intractable, problems of 
formalization. So the idea of a constitutional second best should not be understood on 
the model of an assumed constraint on a variable. Rather, the idea is that certain 
choices or options are outside the set of choices that are feasible or possible. Second-
best constitutional outcomes are understood as the products of choices made by actual 
constitutional actors—that is, as states of the world rather than as states of formal 
models. 
C. Path Dependency 
The general idea of path dependency is that prior decisions constrain (or expand) 
the subsequent range of possible or feasible choices.18 That is, a decision, d, made at 
 
 
 14. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 885 (2003). 
 15. See id. at 914. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 915. 
 18. See PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 
(2004); Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 251 (2000). The discussion in the text focuses on path dependency in the context 
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time t1 may affect the choice set, S = (c1, c2, . . . cn), at time t2. We can define a choice 
set as a set of actions that a given agent could take. Or to expand the path metaphor, if 
we imagine a network of paths through time, from past to future, decisions to branch at 
an earlier point on the chosen path may affect the destinations that one can reach from 
a later point on the path. Sometimes, if we choose the left fork, we may be able to 
reach exactly the same destinations we could have reached via the right fork, but other 
times, our choices foreclose some possibilities altogether. It isn’t always the case that 
in the long run, there’s still time to change the road you’re on.19
This general notion can be specified in various ways. First, we can specify the type 
of effect that a decision has on the choice set. One type of effect is an effect on which 
actions are members of the choice set. Thus, by making a decision d at t1, the resulting 
choice set at t2 would have members c1, c2, and c3, but if the decision had been d! (d 
prime), then the choice set at t2 would have members c1, c3, and c4. In this illustrative 
case, making decision d rather than d! both added and subtracted from the choice set at 
t2. Another type of effect is an effect on the costs associated with the actions that are 
members of the choice set. That is, decision, d, might result in the price of a given 
choice P(c1) being greater than that price would have been if an alternative decision, d!, 
had been made. Notice, however, that if we include price in the specification (or 
description) that designates a choice, then this second type of effect (that is, a cost 
effect) is reducible to the first type of effect (a possibility effect). 
A second way in which we can specify the general notion of path dependency is to 
describe the causal pathway by which decisions affect future choices. On the one hand, 
one might use the phrase “path dependency” to refer to all causal mechanisms.20 On 
the other hand, we could reserve the phrase for a specific type of causal mechanism. 
For example, Paul Pierson has suggested that the notion of path dependency should be 
limited to what he calls “positive feedback.”21 Positive feedback (or self-
reinforcement) involves the idea that as time progresses, the relative benefit of 
maintaining some feature of the system (and hence the relative costliness of modifying 
or eliminating that feature) increases. Once a constitution has been adopted and gone 
into effect, it becomes more costly to adopt a different constitution. Once a federal 
system has been created out of sovereign subunits, it becomes more costly to eliminate 
the federal (or national) government. Once a judicial precedent has been established 
and relied upon, the costs of reversal grow. 
A third way in which we can specify the idea of path dependency is by 
differentiating between the ways in which path dependency might lead to suboptimal 
outcomes.22 Following Liebowitz and Margolis,23 we can distinguish three 
possibilities. First, in some cases, the decision, d, at t1 may have been the best possible 
 
of decision and choice, but the notion could be generalized to include causal processes that do 
not involve choice. 
 19. See LED ZEPPELIN, Stairway to Heaven, on LED ZEPPELIN IV (Atlantic 1971). 
 20. William H. Sewell, Jr., Three Temporalities: Towards an Eventful Sociology, in THE 
HISTORIC TURN IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 245, 262–63 (Terrence J. McDonald ed., 1996) 
(describing the idea of path dependency as “that what has happened at an earlier point in time 
will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time”). 
 21. PIERSON, supra note 18, at 20–21. 
 22. Id. at 28; see also Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Costs Economics and 
Organizational Theory, 2 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 107 (1993). 
 23. S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependency, Lock-in, and History, 11 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995). 
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decision—the consequences are “path dependent” (caused by d), but no better outcome 
was possible. Second, in other cases, it may be that there was an alternative decision, 
d!, that would have led to a better outcome, but that given the information available at 
t1, the better alternative could not have been identified. Third, in a final set of cases, it 
could be that the information available at t1 was sufficient to allow the relevant actors 
to switch from d to d! based on the undesirable outcome at t2. This third form of “path 
dependency” is sometimes called “remediable path dependency.”24 The first two forms 
are nonremediable. 
 
D. The Notion of the Feasible Choice Set 
The idea of a constitutional second best and the distinction between ideal and 
nonideal theory are related to a more fundamental notion—the feasible choice set. We 
might think of a variety of choice sets: the set of all conceivable or imaginable choices, 
the set of all actions that specified actors might choose, and so forth. Of all the 
conceivable choices that might be made by a specified actor (individual, institutional, 
or collective) with respect to a given constitutionally relevant situation, some can be 
called “feasible” and others “infeasible.” 
The term “feasible” as used in natural language is vague, ambiguous, and context 
dependent. Feasibility is vague because feasibility can be a matter of degrees, with 
some choices that are neither clearly feasible nor infeasible. Feasibility is ambiguous 
because it can refer to possibility, workability, practicality, costliness, or some 
combination of these. Feasibility is context dependent, because a given action type or 
action token may be considered practical given one constellation of purpose and 
available alternative actions, but the same action may be considered impractical given 
different purposes and alternatives.25 For example, constitutional amendment might be 
considered “feasible” in the context of a particular constitutional problem, say abortion 
or equal treatment for women, but “infeasible” in the context of another problem, say 
treatment of billboards under the First Amendment or power of the states to legalize 
medical uses of marijuana. 
Given that “feasibility” is vague, ambiguous, and context dependent, claims that a 
given constitutional option is inside or outside of the feasible choice set require further 
specification. At a minimum the criteria for inclusion or exclusion require explicit 
definition. But once the criteria for inclusion are specified, the idea of a feasible choice 
set provides a useful heuristic for expressing assumptions about (or conclusions 
reached) with respect to possibility. 
 
E. Agent Relativity 
Feasibility is a function of both the constitutional option itself and the agent or 
agents for whom the option is proposed. Constitutional agents range from individual 
 
 
 24. See Pierson, supra note 18, at 255. 
 25. An “action type” is a universal, for example, “constitutional amendment” or “reversal 
of a Supreme Court precedent.” An “action token” is a particular, for example, “ratification of 
the Equal Rights Amendment” or “reversal of Brown v. Board of Education.” See Linda Wetzel, 
Types and Tokens, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Apr. 28, 2006, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/types-tokens/ (explaining the type-token distinction). 
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citizens and institutional actors (e.g., senators, representatives, presidents, legislators, 
justices, and judges) to institutions (e.g., Congress, the Supreme Court, the Illinois 
State Legislature) and collectivities (e.g., We the People of the United States, the 
Congress and Legislatures of the Fifty States). 
A given constitutional option might be infeasible relative to one agent, but feasible 
relative to another. Ordinarily, constitutional amendments are outside the feasible 
choice set for ordinary individual citizens: the cases in which an individual citizen can 
bring about the enactment of a constitutional amendment are rare and even when they 
exist may be difficult to identify ex ante. Relative to an individual senator, 
representative, or state legislator, some constitutional amendments may be feasible 
(because they have sufficient support from others to create a practical possibility of 
enactment) and others infeasible (because they lack such support). But relative to the 
collective actor with the power to propose and ratify (Congress and the state 
legislatures), constitutional amendments are always feasible, because action by this 
collective agent is legally sufficient to amend the Constitution. Because feasibility is 
agent relative, a fully specified claim that a given option is inside or outside the 
feasible choice set must specify the agent. Absent such specification (explicit or 
implicit), feasibility claims are so ambiguous as to be virtually meaningless. 
 
F. The Scope of Decision Problem 
Agency is related to another dimension of feasibility, which we can call “scope of 
decision.” What does “scope of decision” mean? Sometimes our scope of decision is a 
single action (an action token), such as the decision by a court in a single case. But not 
all issues take single actions as their scope of decision. 
Consider the following example: constitutional actors (e.g., executive officials, 
legislators, judges, or courts) may choose whether to employ originalism as the 
exclusive methodology for (or practice of) constitutional interpretation—as ultimate or 
final criterion for the correctness of a constitutional interpretation. This decision cannot 
be made on a case-by-case basis. Why not? This question can be answered via a 
thought experiment. Suppose you tried to decide in each case whether to deploy 
originalism as a methodology. How would you make that decision? You might make 
an ad hoc, all-things-considered judgment in each case whether it would be better to be 
an originalist or a living constitutionalist. But if you proceeded in that way, then you 
would already have rejected originalism as the ultimate criterion for decision—because 
your decision in the particular case would ultimately rest on “all things considered” 
and not the original public meaning of the constitution. Notice that I am not arguing 
that one cannot deploy an originalist methodology in some cases and not others. 
Rather, my point is that a case-by-case decision has a different scope than does a 
decision that would range across all cases. 
In the choice between originalism and living constitutionalism as general methods 
of interpretation, it’s the method or practice (ranging across an action type) and not the 
individual decision (or action token) that counts. That general methods of 
constitutional interpretation are practices entails that the scope of decision between 
such methods cannot be made on a case-by-case basis. These methods compete with ad 
hoc pragmatism as a universal method. The decision to be an ad hoc pragmatist 
(selecting textualism, originalism, policy argument, etc. as justifications in each case) 
has wide or universal scope (within the domain), but given such a method, another 
decision of narrow scope (case-by-case) must be made. Rather, the decision whether to 
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be a consistent originalist or an ad hoc pragmatist has as its scope of decision the 
whole domain of constitutional decisionmaking.26
Scope of decision interacts with the specification of agency. For an individual 
judge, the decision whether constitutional interpretation should be guided by an 
originalist methodology is not a feasible choice: one judge (even a very influential 
Supreme Court Justice) cannot adopt originalism as a methodology for all the members 
of the federal judiciary. The most that individual judges can do is decide to adopt 
originalism as a methodology for their own decisions and to attempt to persuade others 
to do the same. In the short to medium term, the most that could result from such an 
individual decision is a mixed regime with some originalist and some nonoriginalist 
decisionmaking. But if the agent is the collectivity of all American judges, then the 
adoption of an originalist practice for the whole domain of constitutional 
decisionmaking is within the feasible choice set. 
 
G. A Quick and Dirty Guide to the Metaphysics of Modality 
Few articles on constitutional theory discuss the metaphysics of modality.27 Even 
the terms “modal” and “modality” may be unfamiliar when they are used, as here, to 
refer to ideas about necessity and possibility—although this usage may evoke a dim 
recollection that “could” and “must” are called “modal verbs.” If unfamiliarity breeds 
contempt, some readers may be skeptical about the value of a philosophical approach 
to the modal notions of possibility and necessity for normative constitutional theory. If 
you are among such readers, know that I shall ask your indulgence for only a page or 
two. 
The primary tool that I shall introduce in this section can be called “possible worlds 
semantics.” Possible worlds talk translates talk about possibility and necessity into talk 
about possible worlds. Begin with the notion of a possible world.28 This notion is 
similar to the notion of a “state of affairs”—which may be familiar from economics. 
 
 
 26. Of course, the content of the practice need not be “pure originalism” or “pure 
constitutionalism.” For example, there could be a practice of constitutional interpretation that 
incorporated a default rule favoring originalism, but allowed departures from originalism based 
on specified criteria. The point is that the scope of the decision to adopt a practice must be 
larger than the individual case in order for there to be a practice. 
 27. But see Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: 
Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 780 (2006); Christopher R. 
Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555, 566–67 
(2006). 
 28. The idea of possible worlds was introduced by Leibniz. See Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr 
von Leibniz, The Theodicy: Abridgement of the Argument Reduced to Syllogistic Form, in 
LEIBNIZ: SELECTIONS 509, 509–11 (Philip P. Weiner ed., 1951). Leibniz used the idea of a 
possible world in answer to the argument against the existence of good from the problem of 
evil. See id. at 511. The argument is not proven, Leibniz maintained, until it is shown that the 
actual world is not the best of all possible worlds. Id.; see generally JOHN DIVERS, POSSIBLE 
WORLDS (2002) (providing a comprehensive introduction to possible worlds semantics and the 
metaphysics of modality); SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1981) (discussing model 
theoretic study of modal logic “possible worlds” semantics); DAVID LEWIS, ON THE PLURALITY 
OF WORLDS (1986) (defending modal realism’s view that our world is one of many, each with its 
own inhabitants); ALVIN PLANTINGA, ESSAYS IN THE METAPHYSICS OF MODALITY (Matthew 
Davidson ed., 2003).  
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The philosophical idea of a “possible world” is understood as a complete history of a 
whole universe.29 If some thing is possible, say event X, we say that X occurs in some 
possible world. Complimentary to the concept of possibility is the concept of necessity. 
Let us say that an event Y is necessary if Y occurs in all possible worlds; a proposition, 
p, is a necessary truth if it is true in all possible worlds. 
The next step is to add the notion of the “actual world,” where actual is an indexical 
term that separates this world from all possible worlds.30 Thus, an actual constitution 
is a constitution that exists in this world. A possible constitution is a constitution that 
exists in at least one possible world. A necessary constitution would be a constitution 
that exists in all possible worlds. Notice that it seems obvious that there are no 
necessary constitutions as there are possible worlds (including the former states of the 
actual world) in which there are no constitutions at all. But almost any constitution you 
can imagine or conceive is surely possible,31 because we can posit a possible world in 
which that imaginable or conceivable constitution exists.32 Logical possibility requires 
only logical consistency, and, in the logical sense, possibility is rarely implicated by 
debates in normative legal theory. 
Not all possible worlds are implicated in debates about constitutional possibility. 
The constitutional possibilities with which we are concerned exist in a subset of all 
possible worlds. We can narrow the set of possible worlds that are the domain of 
constitutional necessity in a series of steps. Each step can be expressed in terms of the 
idea of an accessibility relation.33 The phrase “accessibility relation” may sound 
obscure, but an example will make it crystal clear. For practical purposes, normative 
constitutional theory may sometimes only be interested in those worlds that are 
possible future states of the actual world. Such worlds share the history of the actual 
world up to this moment, and we call worlds that have this property “historically 
accessible.” Notice that talk about historical accessibility frequently can be translated 
into talk about “path dependency.” The feasible choice set—the future choices that are 
possible—may be constrained by history. 
 
 
 29. Sometimes, we may refer to a time slice of a world (either a moment or a period with 
definite or indefinite duration) as a possible world. This can be stated differently: a time slice of 
one world is itself a distinct possible world—one that comes into being when the time slice 
begins and expires when the time slice ends. 
 30. Examples of indexical terms include “I,” “here,” and “now.” See generally David 
Kaplan, Demonstratives, in THEMES FROM KAPLAN 481 (Joseph Almog et al. eds., 1989). 
 31. Of course, the description of a constitution could be inconsistent and hence that 
constitution would not exist in any possible world. The same constitution cannot both include 
and not include a counterpart to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. This is 
not to say that a constitution with contradictory provisions is impossible: of course, the text of 
the constitution could have conflicting deontic requirements. 
 32. Philosophers debate the question of whether all possible worlds are real or whether the 
only real world is the actual world. We shall lay that question aside, and simply talk as if 
possible worlds were real. Nothing shall hang on this: our investigation of constitutional 
possibility will be neutral between modal realism and ersatz modal realism. See generally 
Robert M. Adams, Theories of Actuality, 8 NOÛS 211 (1974); Richard B. Miller, Dog Bites 
Man: A Defence of Modal Realism, 67 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 476 (1989); Alexander 
Rosenberg, Is Lewis’s ‘Genuine Modal Realism’ Magical Too?, 98 MIND 411 (1989). 
 33. See LEWIS, supra note 28, at 7–8. 
318 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 83:307 
 
                                                                                                                
But “historical accessibility” is not a sufficient limitation for the purposes of 
normative constitutional theory. Why not? Because it is logically possible that the 
future states of the actual world could be just about anything you can imagine; there is 
no logical contradiction in a possible world that shares the history of the world up until 
now but in which the United States instantly becomes a parliamentary democracy at 
the next snap of Jeremy Waldron’s fingers. For the purposes of normative 
constitutional theory, we should restrict the domain of possible worlds to those that 
share the basic laws of nature (physics, etc.) with the actual world; these worlds are 
called “nomologically accessible.”34 In nomologically accessible worlds, Waldron’s 
finger snaps do not produce constitutional revolutions. The historically and 
nomologically accessible worlds, then, are those that share the history of the actual 
world up to now and that share our laws of nature. 
At this point it is useful to introduce the idea of “distance” between the actual world 
and some possible world. Adjacent possible worlds are “close” to the actual world. A 
possible world that was just like the actual world—except that this Essay was never 
written—would be very close, i.e., adjacent, to the actual world in which the Essay was 
written for a conference in early December, 2006. Remote worlds are “distant” from 
the actual world. A possible world in which complete essays appear without effort, 
simply by snapping one’s fingers would be more remote. Even more distant worlds are 
easy to imagine. In ascending degree of remoteness, we can imagine a world in which 
the Mongols conquered Europe and the Renaissance did not occur, a world in which 
humans never evolved, or a world in which subtle variations in physical laws made the 
evolution of carbon-based life impossible. 
The constitutional possibilities that concern normative constitutional theory are 
primarily those that exist in historically and nomologically accessible possible worlds 
that are adjacent to the actual world.35 One set of accessibility relationships is 
especially relevant to constitutional discourse: these relationships concern human 
psychology, institutional capacities, social norms, and political attitudes. Some 
constitutional options will not work, given what is true about human psychology—they 
make unrealistic assumptions about what officials or citizens are capable of doing. 
Other constitutional options would require dramatic changes in social norms—their 
success relies on unrealistic assumptions about what citizens and officials believe is 
acceptable or unacceptable conduct. Some options make counterfactual assumptions 
about institutional capacities. And yet other constitutional options are politically 
infeasible—they presuppose political attitudes that only exist in possible worlds that 
are remote from the actual world. But normative constitutional discourse requires what 
we might call “normative space.” That is, normative discourse assumes that minds can 
be changed and the attitudes are not entirely fixed. We can call worlds that conform to 
 
 
 34. Id. at 20. 
 35. For some purposes, however, constitutional theory may wish to investigate questions of 
alternative constitutional history. These are “what if” questions. What if Brown v. Board of 
Education had been decided the other way? What if The Slaughterhouse Cases hadn’t nullified 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? What if President 
Roosevelt had chosen the path of constitutional amendment rather than transformational 
appointment to implement the New Deal’s constitutional program? In each case, we imagine a 
nomologically accessible possible world that was historically accessible from a prior state of the 
actual world. 
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the laws of psychology and political science but in which attitudes and beliefs are not 
fixed “psychologically and politically accessible worlds.” 
Sometimes normative constitutional theory has practical aims—it is concerned with 
how we should act in the actual world. Let us call constitutional action in the actual 
world “constitutional practice.”36 Constitutional practice is not concerned with 
historically and nomologically accessible possible worlds that cannot come into being 
given the limits on human choices. If there is nothing that any agent (individual, 
institutional, or collective) does in any historically and nomologically accessible world 
that brings a future state of the world about, then the future state is outside the feasible 
choice set. Let us call the worlds that are open to human choice in the sense just 
specified “practically accessible.” A practically accessible world must be 
nomologically and historically accessible through human agency. “Constitutional 
practice” is, by stipulation, concerned with possible worlds that are “practically 
accessible.” 
One final accessibility relation requires a brief mention. We can distinguish 
between those worlds that are consistent with our knowledge of the actual world and 
those which are inconsistent with such knowledge. We can use the phrase 
“epistemologically accessible” to capture this idea. Worlds that are consistent with 
everything we know about the actual world are epistemologically accessible. Worlds 
that have a feature contradicted by our knowledge of the actual world are 
epistemologically inaccessible. Not all epistemologically accessible worlds are 
nomologically and historically accessible; there may be historical facts or natural laws 
of which we are unaware. 
We are now in a position to revisit the idea of a feasible choice set. A claim that a 
given constitutional option is outside the feasible choice set is a claim about 
constitutional practice, and hence a claim about which possible worlds are practically 
accessible. Usually, a claim that a given constitutional option is infeasible will rest 
(either explicitly or implicitly) on a claim about human psychology, anthropology, 
economics, sociology, or political science. 
For example, the claim that a constitutional amendment banning abortion is 
politically infeasible, if fully articulated, would rest on claims: (i) about the legal 
requirements for constitutional amendments, (ii) about beliefs and desires causally 
relevant to the motivations of constitutional actors such as congresspersons and state 
legislators, and (iii) about the beliefs and desires of citizens. Thus, the claim might be 
that, given the legal requirements, the motives of those whose assent is legally required 
for a constitutional amendment, and the attitudes of voters, a constitutional amendment 
banning abortion is impossible. In possible worlds talk, we might say that worlds in 
which such amendments become law are relatively remote from our own; in these 
worlds, political actors behave much differently or many citizens have different 
attitudes about abortion or the legal requirements for a constitutional amendment have 
been altered. This remoteness is the underlying reason for our judgment that such a 
constitutional amendment is outside the feasible choice set. 
Constitutional options that exist only in possible worlds that are either historically 
or nomologically inaccessible are outside the feasible choice set in a very strong sense. 
They cannot come about in a future state of the actual world given the natural laws that 
 
 
 36. This is a stipulated usage. The phrase “constitutional practice” could be used in a 
variety of other senses. 
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govern this world. Constitutional options that exist in historically and nomologically 
accessible worlds may nonetheless be only remote possibilities—they may depend on 
changes in beliefs, desires, or institutions that depend on unlikely contingencies. When 
such possibilities are sufficiently remote, we may say they are outside the feasible 
choice set—but if we speak in this way, we are using “feasibility” in a sense that 
diverges from historical and nomological possibility. 
At this point, skeptics might ask what value possible worlds semantics adds to 
constitutional theory. One answer to this question distinguishes between value that is 
added “behind the scenes” and value that is added “on stage.” It seems to me unlikely 
that explicit discussion of possible worlds semantics will be required, except in the 
rarest of circumstances. One can certainly imagine that constitutional theory informed 
by possible worlds semantics might explicitly deploy phrases like “psychologically 
impossible” or “outside the politically feasible choice set.” In such cases, the work 
done by possible worlds talk would be “behind the scenes”—the ideas can be 
expressed without elaborate philosophical machinery. Indeed, in most cases one can 
imagine clarity and precision with any explicit use of the philosophical machinery—
even “behind the scenes.” All that is really required is explicit awareness of the 
distinctions between the various reasons for impossibility and the explicit 
incorporation of these distinctions in the expression of possibility and impossibility 
claims. 
The role of possible worlds semantics, then, is likely to be limited to the rare case in 
which there is a need for a theoretical framework that allows complex, ambiguous, or 
vague claims about possibility and impossibility to be made fully explicit. One can 
imagine that constitutional theorists might invent such a framework “on the spot,” so to 
speak. Or we can imagine that possible worlds semantics would provide a “ready to 
hand” set of devices and distinctions that would enable theorizing about constitutional 
possibility to gain maximum clarity and precision with a minimum of intellectual 
effort. 
 
H. A Very Short Introduction to Positive Constitutional Theory 
So far, the investigation of constitutional possibility has been entirely conceptual. 
But claims about which options are inside or outside of the feasible choice set are 
claims in positive constitutional theory; that is, they are claims about the beliefs, 
desires, and attitudes as well as the laws of human psychology, sociology, and political 
science that govern those human actions that enable constitutional possibilities. The 
social and human sciences are, of course, a vast topic—even for a very short 
introduction. Nonetheless, a very brief mapping of the territory is possible. 
We can begin with the dominant (and allegedly most successful) tool for the 
explanation of human and social behavior, which at a very high level of abstraction can 
be called “rational choice theory.”37 The basic assumption of rational choice theory is 
that individual humans act rationally—where rationality is defined in terms of the 
relationship between beliefs, desires, and actions. An action is rational if it is an action 
 
 
 37. See, e.g., RATIONAL CHOICE (Jon Elster ed., 1986) (collecting essays on rational choice 
as a methodology for the social sciences). But see DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, 
PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 
(1996). 
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that would satisfy the agent’s desires (or preferences) given the agent’s beliefs (the 
information available to the agent). The most familiar example of rational choice 
theory is neoclassical microeconomics, and another important form is game theory.38
As applied to the political domain, rational choice theory is expressed as “positive 
political theory” and “public choice theory.”39 For example, the question whether a 
given constitutional amendment could pass (or a nominee for the Supreme Court could 
be confirmed) can be addressed via a formal model of voting behavior in the House, 
the Senate, and the various state legislatures.40 Such a model might assume that each 
member of these legislative bodies has a set of policy preferences that can be expressed 
as a position on a real line (from right to left) in ideological space. Whether a statute 
will pass depends on the median voter in the legislature—since the majority rule makes 
the vote of the legislator who occupies the median position on the ideology line the 
critical vote. Similarly, whether a given constitutional amendment would pass could 
depend on whether the critical voter in the House, the Senate, and the critical voter in 
all houses of legislatures constituting two-thirds of the total number of states, would 
view the state of affairs that would obtain after the amendment was passed 
(represented as a point on the ideology line) as an improvement over the status quo 
(also represented as a point on the line). This model might be grounded in a more basic 
explanation of legislator behavior in terms of their preferences for gaining and 
retaining office—or by some other model of rational action by legislators. Typically, 
rational choice theories (including positive political theory and public choice theory) 
are expressed in formal models, although such models may also be explicated 
informally or through precise analysis of the conceptual content of the claims made by 
the models. 
Rational choice theory has rivals and variants. For example, recent work in 
behavioral economics emphasizes cognitive mechanisms that may produce behavior 
that traditional rational choice theory would label irrational.41 Another approach 
emphasizes the role of causal mechanisms or microfoundations in the social sciences.42 
One strand of the sociological tradition emphasizes the functional role that institutions 
and other social phenomena may play in producing social stability or cohesion. 
Marxist explanations might describe the limits on constitutional possibility in terms of 
the functional role of law in relationship to class interests.43 Less formally, the limits 
of constitutional possibility might be described by stories or historical narratives that 
 
 
 38. See, e.g., DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY (1991). 
 39. See generally WILLIAM H. RIKER & P.C. ORDERSNOOK, INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE 
POLITICAL THEORY (1972) (discussing positive political theory). For a discussion of public 
choice theory, there are several good choices available. See generally DUNCAN BLACK, THE 
THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, 
THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
(1965). 
 40. See David S. Law & Lawrence B. Solum, Judicial Selection, Appointments Gridlock, 
and the Nuclear Option, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51 (2006). 
 41. See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); JUDGMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). 
 42. See, e.g., SOCIAL MECHANISMS: AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO SOCIAL THEORY (Peter 
Hedström & Richard Swedberg eds., 1998); JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES (1989). 
 43. See G.A. COHEN, KARL MARX'S THEORY OF HISTORY: A DEFENCE (1992). 
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identify the motives and beliefs of particular constitutional actors or groups of such 
actors. Comparative constitutionalism and constitutional history offer additional tools; 
constitutional possibilities may be established by pointing to constitutional models in 
other societies or in our own history. 
Social science can provide the tools for systematic and rigorous discussion of 
constitutional possibility in the service of normative constitutional theory, but such 
tools might be deployed in various ways to undermine or criticize normativity. In an 
extreme form, rational choice theory or its alternatives can be deployed in a 
reductionist or eliminativist program. That is, normative constitutional theory can itself 
be explained as rational, self-interested behavior or as an ideology that serves the 
interests of the ruling class.44 The most extreme version of such reductionism might 
characterize normative constitutional theory as mere “cheap talk” or as the post hoc 
rationalization of constitutional politics that is driven entirely by interests or forces 
outside the realm of normative theory. Positive constitutional theory might swallow 
normativity in another way, by making claims about constitutional determinism—the 
thesis that constitutional actors lack “free will” and hence that our constitutional fate is 
preordained. 
As a practical matter, normative constitutional theory assumes the viability of 
libertarian or compatabilist views about constitutional choice.45 The intellectual 
division of labor among these disciplines assumes that normative constitutional 
theorists are entitled to get on with the business of evaluating constitutional choices; 
the deep questions posed by reductionism and determinism are properly deferred to 
other disciplines, theorists, and occasions. 
The point of this brief survey of positive constitutional theory is simply to suggest 
constitutional theorists can access a wide variety of tools for arguing about 
constitutional possibility. These tools range from the formal, game-theoretic work of 
positive political theorists to the informal, narrative, and historical efforts of new 
institutionalists. All of these approaches provide models for developing claims about 
constitutional possibilities that go beyond hand waving and mere assertion. 
 
I. Why a Toolkit and Not a Theory? 
We need to address (albeit briefly) another set of issues before we move on. Why 
provide a toolkit for thinking about constitutionality possibility and not a theory of 
constitutional possibility? Would the systematic and conceptual unity of a theory 
provide a surer cure for the ills of confusion, ambiguity, and inconsistency? 
Perhaps, but there are at least two reasons for offering a toolkit rather than a theory. 
The first reason is that the topics of feasibility and possibility are relatively unexplored 
in legal theory in general and constitutional theory in particular. A theory produced 
after the issues have been made explicit and digested seems more likely to have lasting 
value than would a theory introduced at such an early stage of development. The 
second reason for preferring a toolkit to a theory is that it is at least “possible” that a 
 
 
 44. For an illuminating discussion, see generally Brian Leiter, Morality Critics, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY (Brian Leiter & M. Rosen eds., 2007). 
 45. DAVID DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM: VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH WANTING (1984); 
Michael McKenna, Compatibilism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Apr. 26, 2004, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/. 
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toolkit is all we need. Thinking about legal or constitutional possibilities may not 
require an elaborate theory that applies to the entire range of modal issues in 
constitutional discourse. For example, possible worlds semantics may illuminate a few 
thorny problems but simply not be worth the intellectual overhead for most discussions 
of constitutional possibility. In some contexts, we might be fully satisfied with the idea 
of constitutional second best combined with a careful explanation of what variable is 
constrained and why. In other contexts, it might be the distinction between ideal and 
nonideal theory that would do the required work. For both reasons, this essay eschews 
a general theory and offers instead a toolkit. 
 
II. AVOIDING THREE CONCEPTUAL ERRORS 
With our conceptual toolkit in place, we can now examine three fundamental errors 
that might confuse our thinking about possibility. The first error is to reduce possibility 
to cost. The second error is to infer that the conceivability of a choice or outcome 
entails its practical possibility. The third error is to equate possibility with probability. 
Each of these errors can and should be avoided. 
 
A. The Error of Reducing Possibility to Cost 
Positive and normative law and economics provide powerful frameworks for 
thinking about the law and policy. Part of that power derives from a focus on costs and 
benefits. Frequently, we can understand and predict behavior by focusing on the 
expected costs and benefits of alternative actions. Sometimes, the action that is morally 
best is the action that accrues the greatest benefits or minimizes costs. If carried to an 
extreme, this focus on costs and benefits might lead to the conclusion that talk about 
possibility and feasibility can be reduced to talk about costs. We might come to believe 
that the sentence, “Outcome A is impossible,” can be reduced to, “Outcome A is too 
costly to be seriously considered.” Or “Choice B is not feasible,” might be equivalent 
to “Choice B is so costly that it should not be considered as an alternative.” 
Possibility cannot be reduced to cost for several reasons. First, some kinds of 
impossibility are unrelated to cost (in even the broadest sense of that term). The 
number of Senators apportioned to each state cannot simultaneously be equal and 
proportionate to population; given unequal population size, this would be a logical 
impossibility. Second, the attribution of costs to options is dependent upon a prior 
notion of possibility. Thus, if we say that option A entails the accrual of cost n, that 
assertion depends on the prior assumption that a state of affairs in which option A is 
chosen, but cost n is not accrued is not a possible state. Third, even when costs play a 
causal role in establishing impossibility, agent relativity differentiates between costs as 
factors to be weighed in decisionmaking and costs that make certain outcomes 
practically impossible. For example, if respecting the freedom of speech is costly in 
cases involving advocacy of terrorism, the Supreme Court (as a relevant constitutional 
agent) might take that fact into account. And in some circumstances, high costs might 
lead the court to view a given constitutional rule as “infeasible.” But this is quite 
different from the court reaching the conclusion that compliance with a rule would be 
impossible, because the costs associated with compliance would be too large for the 
affected governmental entity to bear. In the first case, the costs are factors to be 
weighed in making the decision. In the second case, the costs are causal influences that 
determine which outcomes are possible from the point of view of the Court. 
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B. The Error of Inferring Practical Possibility from Conceivability 
The relationship between conceivability and possibility is complex and much 
debated,46 but for the purposes of normative legal theory the important question 
concerns the relationship between conceivability and practical possibility. Sometimes, 
impossibility assertions are cast in terms of inconceivability. For example, one might 
say, “It is inconceivable that the United States Supreme Court would overrule Brown v. 
Board of Education.”47 In some cases, inconceivability does imply practical 
impossibility. If none of the Supreme Court Justices can imagine overruling Brown v. 
Board and if the action must be conceived as a possibility before it can be performed, 
then inconceivability entails a certain kind of impossibility. The action is impossible 
until it is imagined; it then becomes possible in the sense that it is “on the table” or 
“open for discussion.” But it is a mistake to run the inference in the opposite direction. 
Conceivability does not entail practical possibility. That is because, practical 
possibility is always contingent upon a variety of factors that are not causally 
dependent upon conceivability. For example, a Supreme Court Justice might have 
imagined that the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board would have resulted in 
immediate compliance, but imagining would neither make it so nor make it practically 
possible for it to be so. 
The point of this discussion is that conceivability and practical possibility may be 
related, but they are not identical. When both matter to a particular discussion, each 
should be analyzed on its own terms and the relationship between the two concepts 
should be made explicit. 
 
C. The Error of Equating Possibility and Probability 
 Another tempting error is to equate possibility and probability. Possibility is 
normally understood as a binary function. An action, outcome, or event is either 
possible or impossible—once we specify the “sense of possibility” or, more 
technically, the accessibility relationships that define the relevant set of possible 
worlds. Probability, however, is a scalar: a given outcome may be “more or less likely” 
or, more formally, its probability may assume any real value from 0 to 1. The tempting 
mistake is to equate “possible” with “probability greater than zero” and “impossible” 
with “probability equal to zero.” Given this move, an even more serious error becomes 
tempting: one might then say that assertions of “impossibility” are actually assertions 
of “extreme improbability,” with the consequence that the concept of impossibility 
would turn out to be confused or mistaken. 
But the equation of possibility and probability is, in fact, based on conceptual 
confusion. The nature of the error is easiest to see in the case of logical possibility. It 
simply does not make sense to assert that it is merely improbable that the following 
two statements are both true: (1) this article was written entirely in the twenty-first 
century, and (2) this article was not written entirely in the twenty-first century. It is 
 
 
 46. See CONCEIVABILITY AND POSSIBILITY (Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorn eds., 
2002). 
 47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional 
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 744–45 (1988). 
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logically impossible that both statements are true, and the concept of improbability has 
no application to this kind of case. If someone were to assert the following: “The 
probability of both statements being true is zero,” we would understand that they were 
using probability in a figurative or metaphorical sense. There may be cases where 
“impossible” means “probability of zero,” but not all cases are like this. In some cases, 
talk of probabilities is simply inappropriate. 
 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL POSSIBILITIES 
What are the implications of a richer understanding of constitutional possibility for 
constitutional theory and practice? This question can be answered in two different 
ways. First, we can examine the general implications of constitutional possibility for 
normative theory, and second, we can formulate standards for making sound arguments 
about constitutional possibilities and necessities. 
 
A. Implications for Normative Constitutional Theory 
A systematic investigation of constitutional possibility has some direct implications 
for normative constitutional theory. Let’s begin with the most basic point—ought 
implies can. 
 
1. Ought Implies Can and the Possibility of Collective Action 
The maxim “ought implies can” is associated with Immanuel Kant,48 and according 
to one interpretation the maxim authorizes an inference from an “ought proposition” 
(expressing an obligation) to a modal assertion that it is possible to do the action which 
ought to be done. The conventional understanding interprets the “implies” in “ought 
implies can” to mean that “if a given action, x, is not possible, then that action is not 
obligatory.”49 Thus, no one can be obligated to do the impossible: humans are not 
obligated to perform miracles. Of course, whether “ought” does, in fact, imply “can” 
will depend on what we mean by “ought” and in what sense we mean “can.” Consider 
the following: “I am not obligated to do my duty to keep my promise, because I simply 
cannot bring myself to do anything unpleasant.” Inability in that sense is not excusing. 
In context, the idea is that our practical constitutional obligations are constrained by 
our practical constitutional possibilities. At that level of abstraction, “constitutional 
ought implies constitutional can,” is likely to gain wide assent. But agreement is likely 
to break down once problems of cooperation and group versus individual agency are 
introduced. Are we obligated to lend our support to just efforts to amend a wicked 
constitution, even if we believe that such attempts are doomed to fail? And this 
question is different than the question whether we are obligated to amend a wicked 
 
 
 48. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 30 (Mary J. 
Gregor ed. & trans., 1996); see also STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT: 
MORALITY, RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 33 (2006); Paul Guyer, Immanuel Kant (1724–
1804): Freedom of the Will and the Highest Good, in ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY, Feb. 29, 2004, http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DB047SECT11. 
 49. O(x) # P(x) $ %P(x)#%O(x), which can be parsed as “x is obligatory implies that x 
is possible if and only if x is not possible implies that x is not obligatory.” 
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constitution when we have no power or means to do so. And both of these questions 
are different from a third: do we have an obligation to vote for an amendment to a 
wicked constitution that is before us, even though we know that the amendment will 
not pass? 
Consider the following hypothetical example: suppose that there is a historically 
and nomologically accessible world with a better constitution for the United States—a 
constitution without equal suffrage for the states, without an electoral college, with 
provisions for the removal of incompetent presidents and judges, and so forth. Relative 
to some collective agent (e.g., “We the People” or “Congress and the state 
legislatures”), radical constitutional change is a practical possibility. Assume that 
relative to any individual agent, extensive revision or replacement of the Constitution 
is a practical impossibility. Hypothetically, nothing that I can do will bring about a 
constitutional amendment—and therefore (it could be argued), I have no obligation of 
political morality even to attempt to bring about such a change: in historically and 
nomologically accessible possible worlds, my attempt will be futile. In the 
hypothesized scenario, even the most powerful individual actors (e.g., the Speaker of 
the House or the Senate Majority Leader) cannot act so as to create a significant 
probability that a constitutional amendment would actually become law.50
What are our constitutional obligations given this hypothetical (but not unrealistic) 
case? The hypothetical assumes that we can attempt constitutional reform, but our 
attempt cannot (or with an overwhelming probability, will not) succeed. Does the 
impossibility of success excuse participation in the movement for reform? If 
impossibility excuses, what about improbability? The point of raising these questions 
is to expose the ambiguities and disagreements that lie behind assent to the abstract 
proposition that ought implies can. 
These issues are deep ones, and similar issues are familiar from debates in moral 
theory.51 If they are resolvable, this is not the occasion for their resolution. The very 
modest point of raising them is to emphasize the need for normative constitutional 
theory to be clear about agency and possibility in making claims about constitutional 
obligation. Claims that the existing constitutional order falls short of the constitution of 
ideal theory are one thing; claims that individuals or institutions have violated an 
obligation of political morality by failing to cooperate in a program of constitutional 
reform or revolution are another. 
To the extent that arguments within normative constitutional theory implicitly rest 
on “ought implies can,” clarity may require specification of two things: (1) the identity 
 
 
 50. There may be “critical junctures” at which individual action would become obligatory. 
See generally RUTH BERINS COLLIER & DAVID COLLIER, SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA (2d ed. 
2002) (explaining the idea of “critical juncture”). 
 51. For example, rule-utilitarians and act-utilitarians may disagree over the obligations to 
perform actions that will not be effective given that, in the actual world, others may not 
cooperate in the creation of a good or the avoidance of an evil. Act-consequentialism makes the 
rightness of an action dependent on the consequences of the individual action, whereas ideal 
rule-consequentialism focuses on the consequences of actual compliance with a system of rules. 
See generally BRAD HOOKER, IDEAL CODE, REAL WORLD (2000) (articulating rule-
consequentialism and contrasting it with act-consequentialism). Similarly, deontological moral 
theories may prohibit actions that violate the moral rights of others, even if the consequence of a 
given agent refraining from the prohibited action is that some other person will commit the 
wrong. 
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of the agents addressed by the arguments, and (2) the underlying theory of the political 
morality of individual action that requires cooperation for efficacy. The alternative to 
this kind of specificity is to invite confusion and misunderstanding. 
 
2. Ideal Theory Distinguished from Bad Utopianism 
Ideal theory has an important role to play in normative constitutional theory. Ideal 
theory is arguably part of an intrinsically valuable activity—the discovery of normative 
truths—even if that activity does not or cannot change constitutional practice. 
Moreover, ideal theory may provide ideas, arguments, and standards that are relevant 
to nonideal theory. For example, it might be the case that the constitution of ideal 
theory would provide the telos, or goal, that constitutional practice should strive to 
achieve. 
But ideal theory should be distinguished from what might be called “bad 
utopianism”—a theoretical practice that relies on false assumptions about human 
nature or institutional capacities in order to argue for constitutional arrangements that 
exist only in nomologically inaccessible worlds. Recall that in the Rawlsian sense, 
ideal theory makes idealizing assumptions about compliance, but it does not make 
counterfactual assumptions about the limits of human or institutional capacities. This is 
not to say that a given ideal theory could not exemplify bad utopianism. For example, a 
normative constitutional theory might seek to establish the practical normative 
significance of an ideal constitution, but fail to acknowledge that the ideal’s 
attractiveness rested on an assumption of perfect compliance that is inconsistent with 
actual human nature—an example of what I call “bad utopianism.”52
 
3. The Best of All Possible Constitutions, Comparative Constitutionalism, and 
Constitutional Second Bests 
The question whether either ideal theory or a constitutional model exemplified in 
another society should provide the normative standard for actual constitutional practice 
is strongly connected to the ideas about path dependency and the constitutional second 
best. Consider two ideas: (1) because of path dependency, constitutional comparisons 
are insufficient to establish practical possibility, and (2) the constitutional second best 
may not be the closest approximation to the best of all possible constitutions. These 
two ideas can be fleshed out in the context of an example—the case for parliamentary 
democracy as a constitutional ideal. 
Let’s suppose for the sake of argument that the best of all possible constitutions 
would be a parliamentary democracy with an institutional structure that approximates 
that which exists in the United Kingdom—but without a dodgy royal family. The case 
for this constitution might rest on the idea that democratic governance is justified by 
 
 
 52. This is not to say that something similar to “bad utopianism” could never play a 
constructive role in normative constitutional theory. By making wildly implausible or 
counterfactual assumptions about human nature, we might illuminate the underlying reasons for 
certain normative conclusions. For example, we might assume executive perfection and argue 
that given that assumption, there would be no need for a constitutional requirement of due 
process. That thought experiment might then illuminate why due process is required in the 
actual world. 
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considerations of equality and deliberative autonomy and that the parliamentary form 
does the best job of protecting these basic liberties. From the premise that 
parliamentary democracy is first best, one might argue that incremental changes in the 
actual Constitution of the United States should move constitutional practice in the 
direction of this model. For example, it might be argued that the direct election of 
Senators (as provided by the Seventeenth Amendment) was justified, because it moved 
the United States Constitution in the direction of the parliamentary model.53 The “real 
world” feasibility and desirability of the parliamentary model might be established by 
comparative constitutional analysis—pointing to the United Kingdom and other 
parliamentary democracies as models. 
But granting the premise that parliamentary democracy is the key feature of the best 
of all possible constitutions and that comparative analysis establishes its feasibility, it 
does not follow that incremental changes that move in the direction of the 
parliamentary model are normatively justified. First, it is not necessarily the case that 
the feasible choice set includes the establishment of a parliamentary democracy in the 
United States—except in the very long run or in the cases of a catastrophic 
constitutional crisis. For example, it might be the case that no constitutional 
amendment abolishing equal suffrage of the States in the Senate could gain the assent 
of three-quarters of the state legislatures; moreover, Article V of the Constitution 
purports to insulate equal suffrage in the Senate from change by amendment.54 If 
parliamentary democracy is outside the feasible choice set, then moves in that direction 
cannot be justified as steps on the path towards the ideal. Second, it is not necessarily 
the case that the constitutional second best for the United States is the closest possible 
approximation of parliamentary democracy. The constitutional second best might be 
even more distant from parliamentary democracy than the status quo: for example, it is 
conceivable that more vigorous judicial supervision of policy would counteract the 
Senate’s anti-majoritarian structure in ways that systematically produced better 
outcomes than the more “parliamentary” alternative—a highly deferential practice of 
judicial review. 
 
B. Standards for Modal Constitutional Arguments 
“Modal constitutional arguments” are arguments about constitutional possibilities—
about what constitutional actions and events are possible or necessary. What are the 
implications of our investigation of constitutional possibility for sound arguments of 
this sort? 
 
1. The Criteria for Modal Claims Should Be Articulated 
Claims about constitutional possibility and necessity are ambiguous. For example, 
the claim that a given constitutional action or event is “impossible” is almost never a 
claim about logical possibility, but the precise nature of the modal claim is rarely 
specified. When that lacuna is combined with a failure to specify the relevant agent 
and scope of decision, there is a good chance of misunderstanding and confusion. 
 
 
 53. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; see also United States Senate, Direct Election of Senators, 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Direct_Election_Senators.htm. 
 54. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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The remedy is the articulation of criteria for modal claims. In what sense is a given 
constitutional action or event possible or impossible, feasible or infeasible? In 
particular, it is important for constitutional impossibility claims to make it clear 
whether the claim is based on path dependency (historical accessibility), facts about 
human nature or institutional capacity (nomological accessibility), or the existing 
attitudes, beliefs, and desires of constitutionally relevant agents. 
Meeting the articulation standard will require more precision than is usually found 
in contemporary constitutional theory and practice, but it does not require any 
particular vocabulary. Possible worlds semantics provides a convenient and precise 
vocabulary, but the resources of ordinary English provide sufficient resources for full 
articulation of claims about the possibility or impossibility of constitutional options. 
All that is required is that modal claims be stated in locutions like “This is impossible 
in the sense that . . .” or “The practicality possibility of this proposal depends on . . . .” 
 
2. The Evidence for Impossibility Claims Should Be Stated 
Claims about constitutional possibility are sometimes made without supporting 
evidence. Of course, claims that a given constitutional option is either possible or 
impossible do not always require evidence—some things are obvious and 
uncontroversial. But when a normative constitutional claim rests on the assertion that 
an alternative option is impossible or infeasible, discourse will be improved if evidence 
for the assertion is made explicit. Once the evidence is on the table, it is subject to 
scrutiny and possible refutation. Moreover, there is no general or a priori reason to 
believe that impossibility claims do not require evidence. And the claim that a given 
constitutional option is outside the feasible choice set may turn out to be controversial 
and contestable. 
 
3. Double Standards Should Be Avoided 
Finally and importantly, arguments about constitutional possibility should avoid 
double standards. That is, if one argues against a constitutional alternative on the 
ground that it is outside the feasible choice set, then one is obligated to show that the 
preferred option or options are inside the set—on the basis of the same criteria and in 
light of available evidence. 
The possibility of a constitutional double standard can be illustrated by reference to 
a hypothetical dispute between advocates of constitutional originalism and Dworkin’s 
view of law as integrity.55 Originalists might claim that their approach is superior 
because it provides objective standards for correct constitutional interpretation. A 
Dworkinian might attempt to refute this claim by arguing actual judges are incapable 
of discerning the original public meaning of the Constitution; in the actual world, the 
argument might go, judges and justices lack both the historical chops and the capacity 
to set aside their own preferences. But if the Dworkinian (or quasi-Dworkinian) were 
then to appeal to Dworkin’s ideal judge, Hercules, when the feasibility of law as 
integrity was assessed, a double standard would have been imposed.56 In the actual 
 
 
 55. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
 56. The example is illustrative and not intended as a criticism of Dworkin himself. Dworkin 
knows that Hercules is an idealization and not a role model. 
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world, the same judges who lack historical chops may lack Hercules’s capacity to 
construct the theory that best fits and justifies the law as a whole; in the actual world, 
the same biases that distort originalist judges could distort the method of law as 
integrity. Of course, we can easily imagine that the tables are turned and that it is the 
originalists who deploy a double standard. 
 
IV. TWO CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL POSSIBILITY 
A. Levinson on Structural Constitutional Reform 
In his recent book, Our Undemocratic Constitution, Sandy Levinson argues that the 
United States Constitution suffers from grievous structural defects.57 These defects 
include: (1) the allocation of power to the Senate in which representatives of a 
substantial minority of citizens hold a majority of votes; (2) the very high probability 
that a presidential dictatorship would follow a catastrophic attack on members of 
Congress; (3) too much power for the President; (4) the Electoral College, which 
permits the election of Presidents by a minority of voters; (5) the long period that lame 
duck Presidents and Congresses serve; (6) the limitation of impeachment to high 
crimes and misdemeanors and the absence of a mechanism for removal of the President 
on grounds of incompetency; (7) the functional impossibility of constitutional 
amendment.58 But are solutions to these grievous ills possible? This question has 
special urgency because Levinson’s indictment of Article V rests fundamentally on the 
claim that constitutional amendments are functionally impossible. 
One of the most interesting features of Levinson’s indictment of “our undemocratic 
Constitution” is the role that modal claims play in his argument. In an important sense, 
the “functional impossibility” of amending the Constitution through Article V is an 
essential assumption for all of the constitutional failures that Levinson identifies. If 
Article V were adequately responsive to democratic pressures, then the other problems 
could be fixed, but given the “functional impossibility of amendment,” changes to fix 
grievous flaws (such as the continuity of government problem) face enormous 
obstacles—even though no entrenched political interests would be threatened. 
Levinson’s idea of “functional impossibility” is not theorized, but it is possible to 
reconstruct his argument. The relevant agent to whom the functional impossibility 
claim applies is something like “a national democratic majority.” The agent is a 
majority, because Levinson is explicitly worried about the inability of majorities to 
amend the Constitution. The agent is not “We the People” as a collectivity, because 
supermajorities can amend the Constitution. What accessibility relationships would 
cash out Levinson’s “functional impossibility”? It seems clear that Levinson is dealing 
with historically and nomologically accessible possible worlds; and that his notion of 
what is “functionally possible” is based on an implicit positive theory about the 
attitudes and beliefs that motivate the constitutional actors who are formally 
empowered to propose and ratify constitutional amendments. 
Levinson argues that some of the Constitution’s defects can be corrected through 
constitutional amendments passed through ordinary political processes; for example, 
the problem of continuity in government in the event of a catastrophic attack on 
 
 
 57. LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 167. 
 58. Id. 
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Congress could be corrected by a constitutional amendment that could garner the 
support of current or future members of Congress and state legislatures.59 This portion 
of his argument is based on the idea that some amendments are difficult but not 
impossible. 
When it comes to the most significant structural defects—for example, the equal 
suffrage of large and small states in the Senate, Levinson is quite frank that remedies 
through ordinary political mechanisms are infeasible. As Levinson puts it, “It may 
seem almost frivolous to suggest ordinary politics is the way to correct these 
defects.”60 Even if Senators from large states attempted to form a coalition that would 
lobby for a constitutional amendment, the incentives provided by the institutional 
structure of the Senate would provide powerful incentives for logrolling as usual.61 In 
other words, Levinson does a very credible job of articulating the criteria for 
feasibility, providing evidence for his claims, and he explicitly acknowledges the need 
to avoid double standards.62
So what is the solution? Again, Levinson’s frankness is admirable—he is adamant 
that his suggestions be treated as the start of a conversation and not as definitive 
answers to the problem of constitutional possibility.63 The core of his tentative 
suggestion is collective action by individual citizens, starting with conversations 
among friends and neighbors, progressing to grass roots organizing, and proceeding to 
a petition drive for a new constitutional convention.64 If petitions directed at Congress 
fail, Levinson suggests citizen lobbying of state legislatures—triggering the Article V 
procedure for calling a constitutional convention in response to a petition from two-
thirds of the state legislatures.65
What are we to make of this proposal? Is a mass movement for wholesale 
constitutional reform really feasible? Of course, there is one sense in which it is 
obvious that such a movement is feasible. The collective agent that consists of “We the 
People,” the citizenry of the United States, could engage in the actions that Levinson 
describes. But Levinson cannot consistently focus on this collective agent as the 
solution to his problem. Why not? Because for “We the People,” Article V does not 
make constitutional amendments a “functional impossibility.” If “We the People” are 
the relevant agent, then constitutional amendments are within the feasible choice set. 
So, Levinson cannot appeal to collective agency as the solution to the problem of 
constitutional possibility without employing a double standard. 
In order to avoid a double standard of constitutional possibility, Levinson can (and 
seemingly does) appeal to citizens as individuals. Implicitly, Levinson seems to make 
the (seemingly plausible) assumption that the structural defects in the Constitution are 
sufficiently serious that they could motivate many individuals to act. Thus, he suggests 
that individual citizens might purchase and share his book as a very preliminary step 
towards the creation of a mass movement. But this solution has obvious problems—
problems of collective action that are familiar to economists and political scientists. 
 
 
 59. Id. at 168–69. 
 60. Id. at 169. 
 61. Id. at 171–72. 
 62. Id. at 171 (“Given the central thesis of this book, it would be almost self-contradictory 
to say that the remedy to our most basic ills lies in ordinary politics.”). 
 63. Id. at 172.  
 64. Id. at 172–73. 
 65. Id. at 173–74. 
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One way to frame the collective action problem that Levinson’s solution faces is to 
ask the following question: do I have an obligation of political morality to participate 
in such a movement? The structure of the choice situation is conventionally captured 
by the game theoretic analysis of prisoner’s dilemmas and free rider problems. Let’s 
take a very simple version of the problem. Suppose that I have two options. Option one 
is to join the democratic constitution movement in its current early and informal phase 
by purchasing and distributing several copies of Levinson’s book, participating in 
meetings about its ideas, and writing letters to my Senators and Representatives urging 
them to introduce and support several constitutional amendments. Option two is to 
expend these resources on another project (which might be efforts in support of the 
Global Fund and Oxfam but could just as well be writing a book or reading a few 
dozen novels). Suppose that I reason as follows: if there is sufficient political support 
for Levinson’s program, then my efforts have a vanishingly small chance of making 
the difference between success and failure, but if there isn’t sufficient political support, 
then my efforts will be ineffectual. In either case, I will incur significant opportunity 
costs by investing time and resources in the democratic constitution movement. 
Therefore, it would be irrational for me to join the movement. 
One solution to collective action problems of this sort is an agreement—making the 
cooperation of each contingent upon the cooperation of a group sufficient to bring 
about (or make more likely) the desired consequence. Perhaps, Levinson could 
establish a website that would enable me to pledge to take various actions in support of 
the movement which would be triggered by numerical thresholds. I would pledge to go 
discuss Levinson’s ideas with at least two friends if 100 other citizens would do so as 
well. I would pledge to purchase and distribute ten copies of Levinson’s book, when at 
least 1,000 other citizens had made that pledge. I would pledge to use meetup.com to 
organize a local meeting on the democratic constitution movement, when at least 
10,000 other citizens had made a similar pledge. I would pledge to attend a mass rally 
when at least 100,000 other citizens had made a similar pledge.66
There are familiar problems with agreements of this sort; for example, monitoring 
compliance with the agreement would be costly, creating a secondary collective action 
problem. Compliance is crucial, because the decision whether to comply with the 
agreement presents the same kind of collective action problem as does cooperation in 
the absence of an agreement. One can imagine, however, the deployment of 
inexpensive mechanisms for monitoring compliance; self-reporting of compliance is 
likely to be reasonably accurate, and there might be reasons to believe that modest 
defection from the agreement would be consistent with the rationality of general 
compliance. My commitment of each additional increment of resources would be 
conditional on the success of the prior stage, so the opportunity costs would become 
more substantial only after the likelihood of overcoming the collective action problem 
became more significant: success in the early stages would provide evidence that 
success at later stages was feasible. At some point, the number of participants would 
reach a level where the commitment of resources by each individual member of the 
movement would decline. Once there were a few million members, then a few email 
 
 
 66. These examples are purely illustrative. I do not mean to suggest that agreements like 
this would actually be endorsed by the requisite numbers or that these agreements would result 
in action, even if they were executed. 
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messages to one’s representatives in Congress and the state legislature (plus a modest 
donation to the Democratic Constitution Alliance) would be sufficient. 
Is this story plausible? Recent experience with political organization via the Internet 
suggests that it is not wholly implausible. The limited success of Howard Dean’s 
presidential campaign and the continued ability of moveon.org to raise significant 
funds provide evidence that the low cost of transacting over the Internet can change the 
dynamic of grass roots political organizing.67 In the first phase of this campaign, the 
only member of the movement would be Levinson himself, and the opportunity costs 
for his continued involvement after publication of his book could be substantial indeed. 
In the next phase, concerted effort by a small group would be required in order to 
establish the infrastructure for a mass movement. No one is likely to claim that such a 
movement will necessarily succeed. A more likely assessment is that a movement for 
wholesale constitutional reform has only a slim possibility of success. But if a mass 
movement for constitutional reform does have a practical possibility of success, then 
the same technique might work to enable constitutional amendments on other topics 
through the normal Article V process—undercutting Levinson’s claim that such 
amendments are a functional impossibility. 
My discussion of the speculative possibilities is even more tentative than 
Levinson’s, and my point is not to advocate for, or against, such a movement or to 
claim that such a movement is inside, or outside, the feasible choice set. Rather, my 
very limited ambition is to attempt to deploy some of the available tools to frame the 
discussion in a way that points towards a rigorous, coherent, and consistent discussion 
of constitutional possibility. 
 
B. Scalia on the Case for Originalism 
Disclaimers first. This section of the essay investigates constitutional possibility in 
the context of United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia’s argument for 
originalism as made in his famous essay Orginalism: The Lesser Evil.68 It makes no 
claim about originalism in general or Scalia’s jurisprudence as developed in 
subsequent writings.69 This is a case study of the way that constitutional possibility is 
deployed in academic legal discourse, and not an argument against (or for) originalism 
(or nonoriginalism) on the merits. In addition, the discussion that follows will consider 
several different interpretations of Scalia’s claims about possibility in his essay. Some 
of these interpretations are implausible as reconstructions of Scalia’s own views, but 
that is not the purpose for which they are offered. Rather, the point of the discussion 
that follows is to comprehensively explore the claims that Scalia might have made 
about constitutional possibilities. Our aim is to understand the modality in 
constitutional discourse and not to assess the ultimate merits of Scalia’s argument. 
 
 
 67. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, Fund-Raising Puts Dean in Top Tier of Contenders, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 30, 2003, at 16. 
 68. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
 69. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1998); see also BARNETT, supra note 
2; Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999); Lawrence 
B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and 
the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155 (2006). 
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Finally, this discussion of Scalia’s argument will not differentiate between different 
forms of originalism.70
With those caveats out of the way, let’s take a look at the way that possibility 
figures into Scalia’s argument for originalism: 
[T]he central practical defect of nonoriginalism is fundamental and irreparable: the 
impossibility of achieving any consensus on what, precisely, is to replace original 
meaning, once that is abandoned.71
Thus, an impossibility claim is at the very heart of Scalia’s case for originalism as “the 
lesser evil”: the impossibility of achieving consensus on an alternative to original 
meaning is the “central practical defect of nonoriginalism.” 
But what claim did Scalia make? Scalia’s statement is brief and enigmatic. The 
phrase, “the impossibility of achieving consensus,” fails to specify a sense of 
impossibility, the agent or agents for whom achieving consensus is impossible, and so 
forth. In order to assess Scalia’s claim, we need to unpack it, sorting out the various 
meanings that Scalia might have intended. 
On one interpretation, which we can call the “conceptual interpretation,” Scalia’s 
argument seems to suffer an obvious defect. Scalia divides the set of constitutional 
theories into two subsets: originalist and nonoriginalist. He then argues that the defect 
of the set of nonoriginalist theories is that it is impossible for them to form a consensus 
on what is to replace originalism; this defect is obviously not present in originalism, 
which by definition is able to form a consensus on originalism itself. If we interpret 
Scalia as making a conceptual claim, then his argument is sound (valid with true 
premises), but trivial. The members of the subset of originalist theories are, by 
definition, originalist. The members of the subset of nonoriginalist theories are, as a 
matter of fact and definition, different from one another—their only common 
characteristic is that they are nonoriginalist. Brennan’s “living constitutionalism” is 
different from Dworkin’s “law as integrity.”72 Given the way that Scalia has drawn the 
lines and the fact that nonoriginalist theories differ from one another, “consensus” 
among them is logically impossible.73 This argument is trivial, because it can be made 
on behalf of any constitutional theory. For example, if we divide constitutional theories 
into Dworkinian and non-Dworkinian theories, it is impossible for the non-Dworkinian 
theories to form a consensus. So this cannot be the kind of impossibility claim that 
Scalia is making—at least if we are to interpret him charitably. 
How else might we interpret Scalia’s impossibility claim? Scalia might be claiming 
that it is impossible for some set of judges (the current bench or perhaps the politically 
 
 
 70. Among the forms of originalism that have played a prominent role in recent discussions 
are “original intentions” and “original meaning.” See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory 
Lexicon 019: Originalism, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/01/legal_ 
theory_le_1.html (Jan. 18, 2004). 
 71. Scalia, supra note 68, at 862–63. 
 72. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 55; William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the 
United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986). 
 73. That is, it is logically impossible for different constitutional theories to be identical to 
one another. Scalia cannot charitably be interpreted as making the much stronger claim that 
there is no possible world in which there is one and only one nonoriginalist theory (or family of 
sufficiently similar theories). 
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feasible bench) to form a consensus on any nonoriginalist theory. Understanding this 
interpretation of Scalia’s argument requires us to specify the relevant agent: for whom 
would consensus on a particular nonoriginalist theory be impossible. If his claim is 
about the current bench (e.g., all federal judges or all Supreme Court Justices), then 
Scalia’s argument faces severe difficulties. Scalia’s claim would be trivially false if 
viewed as a claim about what is possible for the federal bench as a collective actor: it is 
not impossible for the collectivity of federal judges to adopt Dworkin’s theory of law 
as integrity. But if Scalia’s claim is not a claim about the collectivity, then it runs into a 
double standard problem. Suppose we hold the attitudes of judges about the proper 
methodology for constitutional interpretation constant. It will then be the case that 
consensus on any one nonoriginalist theory is impossible, but if we apply this same 
standard to originalism, it becomes apparent that consensus on originalism would also 
be impossible. Just as the current set of judges or Justices do not agree on any one 
nonoriginalist theory, they also do not agree on originalism. For these reasons, the 
“current bench interpretation” of Scalia’s impossibility claim is implausible. Either 
judges can change their minds or they can’t. If they can, then they could agree on some 
rival of originalism; if they cannot, then consensus on originalism is no more possible 
than is consensus on one of originalism’s rivals. 
Yet another variation of Scalia’s impossibility claim might focus on the possible 
configurations of the future bench—given appointments process and political realities. 
Call this the “politically feasible bench interpretation.” That is, Scalia might be arguing 
that it is politically feasible to appoint an originalist federal bench, but that it would not 
be politically feasible to appoint federal judges who would agree on a single 
nonoriginalist approach. If this were Scalia’s claim, then it seems unlikely to be correct 
as an empirical matter—at least over the long run. There is no consensus among 
existing political actors that originalist judges are acceptable. Of course, there may be 
agreement on the abstract proposition that judges should enforce the commands of the 
constitutional text, and even that historical evidence of original meaning should be 
considered. But that agreement is likely to become shaky as soon as particular 
constitutional controversies—such as the death penalty, abortion, or affirmative 
action—enter into the discussion. It may be possible that political alignment plus a 
cluster of Supreme Court vacancies would permit appointments creating a majority of 
five originalists on the Supreme Court, but if that is the standard then it would seem 
that equally plausible scenarios would enable the appointment of a majority of five 
nonoriginalist justices who agreed on a single rival to originalism. 
Suppose we reject the conceptual current-bench politically-feasible-bench 
interpretations of Scalia’s argument. How else might we interpret his impossibility 
claim? Another alternative is suggested by the following passage: 
Now the main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution—or, for that 
matter, in judicial interpretation of any law—is that the judges will mistake their 
own predilections for the law. Avoiding this error is the hardest part of being a 
conscientious judge; perhaps no conscientious judge ever succeeds entirely. 
Nonoriginalism, which under one or another formulation invokes “fundamental 
values” as the touchstone of constitutionality, plays precisely to this weakness. It 
is very difficult for a person to discern a difference between those political values 
that he personally thinks most important, and those political values that are 
“fundamental to our society.” Thus, by the adoption of such a criterion judicial 
personalization of the law is enormously facilitated. (One might reduce this danger 
by insisting that the new “fundamental values” invoked to replace original 
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meaning be clearly and objectively manifested in the laws of the society. But 
among all the varying tests suggested by nonoriginalist theoreticians, I am 
unaware that that one ever appears. Most if not all nonoriginalists, for example, 
would strike down the death penalty, though it continues to be widely adopted in 
both state and federal legislation.)74
What light does this passage shed on Scalia’s impossibility claim? First, it clarifies that 
by “nonoriginalism,” Scalia actually means to refer to theories of interpretation that 
focus on those values that are fundamental to our society. Second, what Scalia claims 
is impossible seems to be discernment of the difference between those values that are 
fundamental to our society and those values that the individual (e.g., the judge or other 
official interpreting the Constitution) believes are fundamental. These two points 
suggest a reconstruction of Scalia’s claim. Given the fundamental values approach, it is 
difficult for individuals to discern the difference between their own values and the 
values that are fundamental to our society. Some individuals will succeed, but others 
will fail. Given that some will fail and given the fact of pluralism (that there are a 
plurality of views about which values are fundamental), no consensus on the content of 
the values that are fundamental to our society can emerge. Therefore, it is impossible 
for adherents to a fundamental values approach to reach agreement on what the 
Constitution means. 
How does Scalia’s argument fare if judged by the standards for modal constitutional 
argument set out above?75 The first standard requires that the criteria for modal claims 
be articulated: it seems reasonably clear that Scalia does not attempt (either explicitly 
or implicitly) to articulate the criteria for impossibility that forms the basis of his claim. 
The second standard requires explicit statement of the evidence for impossibility. 
Scalia offers no evidence for his claim, although he may have offered an explanation 
of the mechanism—that discernment is difficult. The third standard calls for avoidance 
of double standards. Application of the third standard is difficult, because of the 
ambiguity and vagueness of Scalia’s impossibility claim. Is consensus on original 
meaning possible (or “less difficult”) than consensus on “the values that are 
fundamental to our society?” A good answer to that question will take us too far afield 
of the focus of this inquiry—the logic of modality in constitutional discourse. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE PROBLEM OF FALSE CONSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY 
This Essay began with the problem of illusory constitutional possibilities. That 
problem can be addressed with a variety of tools. Constitutional theorists can recognize 
that there is an important role for ideal constitutional theory, while recognizing the 
dangers of bad utopianism. They can play close attention to idea of a constitutional 
second best and rigorously define the criteria for inclusion in the feasible choice set. 
Constitutional theorists can explicitly articulate assumptions about agency and the 
scope of decision. They can disambiguate the various sense of possibility and utilize 
the tools of positive constitutional theory to construct sound arguments about 
constitutional possibility. 
 
 
 74. Scalia, supra note 68, at 863. 
 75. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
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The problem of illusory constitutional possibility has an evil twin: the problem of 
false constitutional necessity.76 It requires little effort to make the case that any truly 
significant constitutional change is a practical impossibility and draw the conclusion 
that questions of constitutional design should be off the table of constitutional theory. 
At any given time, the chance that action by any given individual would make a crucial 
contribution and enable a constitutional reform that would otherwise fail surely 
approachs zero. Taken to an extreme, this approach would limit the domain of 
constitutional theory to the constitutional questions that are contestable given the 
current configuration of judicial electoral politics. That is, we might limit our horizon 
of constitutional possibilities to adjacent possible worlds that are practically accessible 
to key political and constitutional actors in actual world. 
Limiting our constitutional horizons in this way would be a mistake. The 
Constitution of 1789, the Reconstruction Amendments, popular election of Senators, 
and the franchise for women are all part of the history of the actual world. Although 
some constitutional possibilities may be illusory, it is surely true that in the long run, 
there are few constitutional necessities that take serious options off the table. And if 
one believes that normative constitutional theory should take the long view—should 
seek constitutional knowledge with relevance that transcends particular moments in 
constitutional history, then most claims of constitutional necessity are false. Practical 
constitutional theory operates in the space between illusory constitutional possibilities 
and true constitutional necessity. 
 
 
 76. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTINECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY 
IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY (rev. ed., 2004). 
